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Abstract
We study the problem of privacy in the framework of Timed Automata. By dis-
tinguishing between secret and observable actions we formulate a property of no-
privacy in terms of a property of the language accepted by a Timed Automaton,
and we give an algorithm checking such property.
1 Introduction
One of the main requirements of mobile code is that it must guarantee some
kind of security to clients executing it. One of the security requirements is the
client's privacy, namely that executing mobile code does not imply leaking of
private information.
Several papers (see, among the others, [3],[4],[5], [6],[7]) dealing with pri-
vacy, consider two-level systems, where the high level (or secret) behavior is
distinguished from the low level (or observable) one. In the mentioned papers,
systems respect the property of privacy if there is no information ow from
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the high level to the low level. This means that the secret behavior cannot in-
uence the observable one, or, equivalently, no information on the observable
behavior permits to infer information on the secret one.
Our aim is to study the problem of privacy in real-time systems in the
framework of Timed Automata [1]. When using this formalism, the possible
behaviors of a system are described by a set of innite timed words, namely
innite sequences of pairs (action performed, time of ring). In describing
two-level systems, we distinguish between high-level and low-level actions.
We formulate a no-privacy property as follows: if, whenever one can observe
a given timed sequence of observable actions, one is sure that the system
performs a certain secret action, then the system is insecure. The reason is
that one can infer information on the secret behavior from the observation of
the observable one.
We give an algorithm that exploits the region graph obtained from a Timed
Automaton and checks the no-privacy property for a given sequence of observ-
able actions and a given secret action.
2 HL Timed Automata
In this section we introduce the formalism of HL Timed Automata, as an
extension of Alur and Dill's Timed Automata.
2.1 Security alphabet and timed words
A security alphabet is a pair consisting of two disjoint nite sets of actions
(L;H). The set L contains the low actions, which can be performed by the
system and can be observed by the external environment, and the set H
contains the high actions, which can be performed by the system and are
visible only inside the system.
Given any time domain T (non-negative rational numbers, or non-negative
real numbers, as examples), a timed word ! on (L;H) and T is a pair of func-
tions (!
1
; !
2
) such that !
1
: N ! (L [H) and !
2
: N ! T . Intuitively, ! de-
scribes the behavior of a system that performs action !
1
(i) at time
P
i
h=0
!
2
(h).
A timed word must satisfy the time progress property, namely for each time
value t 2 T , there is some index i such that
P
i
h=0
!
2
(h) > t.
Given a timed word ! = (!
1
; !
2
), let us denote with !
L
the projection of !
on L, namely the (possibly nite) sequence (!
1
(i
1
); !
2
(i
1
)); (!
1
(i
2
); !
2
(i
2
)); : : :
such that, for each index i
j
, !
1
(i
j
) 2 L and, for each i
j
< k < i
j+1
, !
1
(k) 2 H.
The sequence !
L
describes the part of ! that can be observed by the external
environment.
Let us denote with F
!
the function that gives the index in ! of the low action
in position j in !
L
, namely F
!
(j) = i
j
.
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2.2 Clock valuations and clock constraints
We assume a set X of variables measuring time, called clocks. Intuitively,
clocks increase uniformly with time when an automaton is in whatsoever state.
A clock valuation over a set of clocks X is a mapping v : X ! T assigning
time values to clocks. For a clock valuation v and a time value t, let v + t
denote the clock valuation such that (v+t)(x) = v(x)+t. For a clock valuation
v and a subset of clocks Y  X, let v[Y ] denote the clock valuation such that
v[Y ](x) = 0, if x 2 Y , and v[Y ](x) = v(x), otherwise.
Given a set of clocks X, we consider the set of clock constraints over X,
denoted (X), which is dened by the following grammar, where  ranges
over (X), x 2 X, c 2 T and # 2 f<;;=; 6=; >;g:
 ::= x# c j ^  j : j _  j true :
We write v j=  when the clock valuation v satises the clock constraint .
More precisely, v j= x# c i v(x)# c, v j= 
1
^
2
i both v j= 
1
and v j= 
2
,
v j= 
1
_ 
2
i either v j= 
1
or v j= 
2
, v j= : i v 6j= , and v j= true.
2.3 The formalism
Denition 2.1 Given a security alphabet (H;L), a HL Timed Automaton
(TA
HL
) is a tuple A = ((L;H); A
1
; : : : ; A
m
), where, for each 1  i  m,
A
i
= (Q
i
; q
0
i
; Æ
i
; X
i
) is a sequential automaton, with:

a nite set of states Q
i

an initial state q
0
i
2 Q
i

a set of clocks X
i

a set of transitions Æ
i
 Q
i
 (X
i
) (L [H) 2
X
i
Q
i
.
The sets of clocks X
1
; : : : ; X
m
are pairwise disjoint.
Intuitively, a transition (q; ; a; Y; q
0
) of an automaton A
i
res in corre-
spondence with the performance of action a when state q is active and the
clock valuation of A
i
satises the clock constraint . In such a case, state q
0
is entered and the clocks in Y are reset.
Let us describe now the behavior of a TA
HL
A = ((L;H); A
1
; : : : ; A
m
).
A conguration of A is a tuple s = ((q
1
; v
1
); : : : ; (q
m
; v
m
)) such that, for
each 1  i  m, q
i
is a state in Q
i
and v
i
is a clock valuation over the set of
clocks X
i
.
The initial conguration s
0
is the tuple ((q
0
1
; v
0
1
); : : : ; (q
0
m
; v
0
m
)), with q
0
i
the
initial state of A
i
and with v
0
i
the clock valuation such that v
i
(x)
0
= 0 for
each clock x 2 X
i
.
There is a step from conguration s = ((q
1
; v
1
); : : : ; (q
m
; v
m
)) to congura-
tion s
0
= ((q
0
1
; v
0
1
); : : : ; (q
0
m
; v
0
m
)) through action a at time t, written s!
a
t
s
0
, if
and only if, for each 1  i  m, there is a transition (q
i
; 
i
; a; Y
i
; q
0
i
) 2 Æ
i
such
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Fig. 1. The web system.
that (v
i
+ t) j= 
i
and v
0
i
= (v
i
+ t)[Y
i
]. Intuitively, each clock constraint 
i
is
satised by the clock valuation v
i
+ t and all clocks in Y
i
are reset.
A timed word (!
1
; !
2
) is accepted by A if there exists a innite sequence
of steps s
0
!
!
1
(0)
!
2
(0)
s
1
!
!
1
(1)
!
2
(1)
: : : from the initial conguration s
0
.
The language accepted by A (denoted by L(A)) is the set of timed words
accepted by A.
By application of a cartesian product construction, any TA
HL
can be trans-
formed into an equivalent (namely, accepting the same language) TA
HL
con-
sisting of only one sequential component, namely into an Alur and Dill's Timed
Automaton.
Proposition 2.2 For any TA
HL
A there exists a TA
HL
A
0
composed by one
only sequential automaton such that L(A) = L(A
0
).
3 The No-privacy Property
Given sequences d and d
0
, let d 
P
d
0
denote the fact that d is a prex of d
0
.
Let a 2 H, d be a nite sequence (a
1
; t
1
); : : : ; (a
h
; t
h
) with a
1
; : : : ; a
h
2 L
and t
1
; : : : ; t
h
2 T , and i be an index 1  i < h. We dene the no  privacy
property NPr(d; i; a) for a TA
HL
A as follows:
for each ! 2 L(A); d 
P
!
L
implies a 2 f!
1
(F
!
(i)+1); : : : ; !
1
(F
!
(i+1) 1)g:
Intuitively,NPr(d; i; a) expresses that, whenever the sequence d of low symbols
is read, the high symbol a is read between the low level actions a
i
and a
i+1
,
and, therefore, there is an information ow from high level to low level, namely
information on the secret behavior can be inferred from information on the
observable behavior.
Example 3.1 We model the time attack on web privacy described in [2]. The
attack compromises the privacy of user's web-browsing histories by allowing
4
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a malicious web site to determine whether or not the user has recently visited
some other, unrelated, web page w. A Java applet is embedded in the mali-
cious web site and is run by the user's browser. The applet rst performs a
request to a le of w, and then performs a new request to the malicious site.
So, the malicious site can measure the time elapsed between the two requests
which it receives from the user, and, if such a time is under a certain bound,
it infers that w was in the cache of the browser of the user, thus implying that
w has been recently visited by the user.
In Fig. 1 we model this problem. Automaton A
c
represents the cache. The
time elapsed between a request r
c
and an answer a
c
is in the interval [2; 5].
Automaton A
w
represents the site w. The time elapsed between a request r
w
and an answer a
w
is in the interval [100; 250]. The automaton A
u
represents
the requests by the user that downloads the page of the malicious site. First
of all, it performs a request r
e
to the malicious site. Then, when it receives
the answer a
e
, it performs a communication either with the cache or with the
site w in a time belonging to the interval [1; 2]. Finally, it performs another
request r
e
and it waits for an answer from the malicious site. We assume that
there are transitions from state c
1
to state c
1
labeled with symbols r
e
, a
e
, r
w
and a
w
. Analogously there are transitions from state s
1
to state s
1
labeled
with symbols r
e
, a
e
, r
c
and a
c
.
The only visible actions for the malicious site are r
e
and a
e
, so the alphabet
(L;H) is (fr
e
; a
e
g; fr
c
; a
c
; r
w
; a
w
g).
Now, if we consider d = (r
e
; 10)(a
e
; 20)(r
e
; 200), then we have the no pri-
vacy property NPr(d; 2; a
w
).
3.1 Region graph
Our aim is to show that the property NPr(d; i; a) is decidable.
To this purpose, let us recall rst the notion of region graph of a timed
automaton, as given in [1]. By proposition 2.2 it suÆces to consider automata
with only one sequential component.
As in [1], without loss of generality we assume clock constraints permitting
only comparison with integer constants. In fact, given any automatonA, there
is a constant t such that, for each constant c appearing in a clock constraint
in A, c  t is an integer. Let A  t be the automaton obtained by replacing
each c appearing in a clock constraint in A by c  t. In [1] it is proved that
a word (a
1
; t
1
) : : : (a
n
; t
n
) : : : is in the language L(A) if and only if the word
(a
1
; t
1
 t) : : : (a
n
; t
n
 t) : : : is in the language L(A  t). As a consequence,
NPr(d; i; a) holds for A if and only if NPr(d  t; i; a) holds for A  t.
Let us consider the equivalence relation  over clock valuations that con-
tains each pair of clock valuations v and v
0
such that:

for each clock x, either bv(x)c = bv
0
(x)c, or both v(x) and v
0
(x) are greater
than c
x
, with c
x
the largest integer appearing in clock constraints over x.

for each pair of clocks x and y with v(x)  c
x
and v(y)  c
y
, fract(v(x)) 
5
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fract(v(y)) if and only if fract(v
0
(x))  fract(v
0
(y)) (fract(z) indicates
the fractional part of z).

for each clock x with v(x)  c
x
, fract(v(x)) = 0 if and only if fract(v
0
(x)) =
0.
Note that for each pair of valuations v and v
0
, and for each clock constraint
 in A, it holds that:
if v  v
0
then v j=  i v
0
j= :
A clock region is an equivalence class of clock valuations induced by .
We denote by [v] the equivalence class of  containing v. Note that the set of
clock regions is nite.
Clock regions can be expressed with conditions of the form x = c, c < x <
c+ 1 and x > c
x
.
A region is a pair (q; [v]), with q a state and [v] a clock region. The initial
region is the pair (q
0
; [v
0
]) with q
0
the initial state and v
0
the valuation such
that v
0
(x) = 0, for each clock x.
The region graph R(A) is a graph having the regions of A as set of
nodes and having an edge h(q; ); a; I; (q
0
; 
0
)i, with I an interval of the form
(c; c
0
),[c; c] or (c
m
;1) (where c < c
m
, c 2 N and c
m
is the largest constant
that appears in the constraints of A) if and only if, for each pair of valuations
v 2  and v
0
2 
0
, (q; v)!
a
t
(q
0
; v
0
) for some time t 2 I.
Note that, dierently from [1], we label edges of the region graph also with
an interval.
Without loss of generality, we can consider only the nodes that can be
reached from the initial region without cycles of edges labeled with interval
[0; 0] which would violate the assumption of progress of time.
3.2 Checking no-privacy
Our algorithm checking no-privacy constructs a set of intervals by applying
operations, which are dened below, to intervals of the region graph.
Given two intervals I and I
0
, let us denote with I  I
0
the interval
I  I
0
= ft t
0
j t 2 I and t
0
2 I
0
g :
Given a step leading to a region (q; ) in a time in the interval I, and a step
from (q; ) to another region (q
0
; 
0
) in the interval I
0
, a time in I+I
0
is needed
to reach (q
0
; 
0
) through (q; ), provided that the waiting time in q does not
depend on the time consumed to reach q.
Given two intervals I and I
0
, let us denote with I  I
0
the interval such
that inf(I  I
0
) = inf(I) + inf(I
0
) + 1, sup(I  I
0
) = sup(I) + sup(I
0
)   1.
Moreover, if inf(II
0
) = sup(II
0
) then we assume that (II
0
) is left-closed
and right-closed. Otherwise, I  I
0
is left-closed if and only if both I and I
0
are, and I  I
0
is right-closed if and only if both I and I
0
are.
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Given a step leading to a region (q; ) in a time in the interval I, and a
step from (q; ) to another region (q
0
; 
0
) in the interval I
0
, a time in I  I
0
is needed to reach (q
0
; 
0
) through (q; ), provided that the waiting time in q
depends on the time consumed to reach q, in the sense that the longer is the
time consumed before entering q, the shorter is the waiting time in q. This
happens if there is a constraint c < x < c+ 1 in , for some clock x.
Finally, let us denote with (I)
t
the interval:
(I)
t
=
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
I if sup(I)  t
I [ [sup(I);1) if inf(I)  t < sup(I)
(t;1) otherwise.
Note that t 2 I if and only if t 2 (I)
t
. We have introduced notation (I)
t
since
the set of the intervals (I)
t
, such that I is a sum (obtained by means of either
+ or ) of intervals of a region graph, is nite.
Let us dene now the algorithm Ch-path-symb. Given regions p and q, a
high symbol a, a constant t and a low symbol a
0
, Ch-path-symb checks whether
there exists a sequence of steps labeled with symbols in H n fag followed by a
step labeled with a
0
and taking from p to q at time t.
Algorithm 1
Ch-path-symb(p,q:region, a:high-symbol, t:T , a
0
: low symbol): boolean
(i) tovisit:=f(p; [0; 0]; false)g;
(ii) visited:=;;
(iii) while true do
(iv) if empty(tovisit) then return false
(v) else
(vi) (r; I; tt):=extract(tovisit);
(vii) add((r; I; tt),visited);
(viii) if (tt=true and (r = q) and t 2 I) then return true;
(ix) if tt=false then
(x) for each edge hr; a
00
; I
0
; r
0
i 2 R(A) with a
00
2 H n fag [ fa
0
g
(xi) if x = t
0
is a constraint in r then c:=(r
0
; (I + I
0
)
t
; (a
00
= a
0
))
(xii) else if I
0
= [0; 0] then c:=(r
0
; I; (a
00
= a
0
))
(xiii) else c:=(r
0
; (I  I
0
)
t
; (a
00
= a
0
))
(xiv) if c62 visited ^ ((I + I
0
)
t
6= (t;1)) then Add(c,tovisit).
A tuple (r; I; false) means that the region r can be reached from p in a
time in the interval I by reading symbols in Hnfag. A tuple (r; I; true) means
that the region r can be reached from p in a time in the interval I by reading
7
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symbols in H n fag and, subsequently, symbol a
0
.
So the algorithm considers rstly the pair (p; [0; 0]; false). Given a pair
(r; I; false) and an edge hr; a
00
; I
0
; r
0
i in R(A) for some symbol a
00
2 H n fag[
fa
0
g, if the clock region in r satises x = t
0
for some clock x and constant t
0
,
then the algorithm considers either the pair (r
0
; (I + I
0
)
t
; false), if a
00
6= a
0
, or
the pair (r
0
; (I+ I
0
)
t
; true), if a
00
= a
0
. The condition x = t
0
in r ensures that a
time in I
0
must be elapsed after r is entered. We use interval (I + I
0
)
t
instead
of (I + I
0
) to guarantee that Ch-path-symb generates nite intervals.
If, on the contrary, the clock region in r does not satisfy x = t
0
for any
clock x and constant t
0
, then there are two cases. If hr; a
00
; I
0
; r
0
i is such
that I
0
= [0; 0], then the clock regions of r and r
0
coincide, and, therefore, we
consider the tuple (r
0
; I; (a
00
= a
0
)). Otherwise, the tuple (r; (II
0
)
t
; (a
00
= a
0
))
is considered. The interval (II
0
)
t
takes into account that the minimal (resp.
maximal) waiting time in r follows the maximal (resp. minimal) waiting time
needed to reach r. Also in this case we use interval (I I
0
)
t
instead of (I I
0
)
to guarantee that Ch-path-symb generates nite intervals.
Finally, if a tuple (r; I; tt) with r = q, t 2 I and tt = true is generated,
then Ch-path-symb terminates successfully.
The following lemmata state the correctness of the algorithm.
Lemma 3.2 For any pair of regions p and q, high symbol a, time t and low
symbol a
0
, Ch-path-symb(p,q,a,t,a
0
) terminates.
Proof. Both the regions of the graph and the intervals that can been gener-
ated by the algorithm are nite and, as a consequence, also the tuples (r; I; tt)
that are generated are nite. 2
Lemma 3.3 If (!
1
; !
2
) 2 L(A) with f!
1
(i); !
1
(i+1); : : : ; !
1
(j  1); !
1
(j)g 
H n fag and !
1
(j + 1) the low symbol a
0
, then there exists an innite se-
quence of steps (q
0
; v
0
) !
!
1
(0)
!
2
(0)
(q
1
; v
1
) !
!
1
(1)
!
2
(1)
: : : if and only if Ch-path-
symb((q
i
; [v
i
]),(q
j+2
; [v
j+2
]),a,
P
j+1
h=i
!
2
(h),a
0
).
Lemma 3.3 is a direct consequence of the properties of the region graph
proved in [1].
We dene also the algorithm Ch-path that checks whether there exists a
sequence of steps labeled with high symbols and followed by a step labeled
with the low symbol a
0
taking from a given region p to a given region q in
a given time t. We obtain it from Ch-path-symb by replacing the condition
a
00
2 H n fag [ fa
0
g in line (x) with the condition a
00
2 H [ fa
0
g.
The following results are the analogous of Lemma 3.2 and Lemma 3.3.
Lemma 3.4 For any pair of regions p and q, time t and low symbol a
0
, Ch-
path(p,q,t,a
0
) terminates.
Lemma 3.5 Let (!
1
; !
2
) 2 L(A) with f!
1
(i); !
1
(i+1); : : : ; !
1
( 1j); !
1
(j)g 
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H and !
1
(j+1) the low symbol a
0
, then there exists an innite sequence of steps
(q
0
; v
0
) !
!
1
(0)
!
2
(0)
(q
1
; v
1
)!
!
1
(1)
!
2
(1)
: : : if and only if Ch-path ((q
i
; [v
i
]),(q
j+2
; [v
j+2
]),
P
j+1
h=i
!
2
(h), a
0
).
The following algorithm Ch-NPriv checks whether there exists a sequence
of steps from the initial region (q
0
; [v
0
]) due to a low sequence d that does not
perform the high symbol a between the low symbols in d(i) and d(i + 1). At
iteration k, the set A contains the regions that can be reached from (q
0
; [v
0
])
by reading d(0); : : : ; d(k), by reading symbols in H n fag between d(i) and
d(i + 1), and by reading symbols in H between d(j) and d(j + 1), for each
j 6= i. So, if A is empty then the sequence of steps we were looking for does
not exist, and NPr(d; i; a) holds.
Algorithm 2
Ch-NPriv(d:L  sequence, i:N, a:high  symbol): boolean
(i) k:=0;
(ii) A:=f(q
0
; [v
0
])g;
(iii) while k  length(d) do
(iv) (a
0
; t):=d(k);
(v) B:=;;
(vi) while A6= ; do
(vii) (q; [v]):=extract(A);
(viii) for each region (q
0
; [v
0
]) 2 R(A)
(ix) if (k = i and Ch-path-symb((q; [v]),(q
0
; [v
0
]),a,t,a
0
)) OR
(x) (k 6= i and Ch-path((q; [v]), (q
0
; [v
0
]),t,a
0
))
(xi) then Add((q
0
; [v
0
]),B);
(xii) A:=B;
(xiii) k:=k+1;
(xiv) return A = ;.
The following results state the correctness of the algorithm Ch-NPriv.
Lemma 3.6 For any nite sequence d, index i and high symbol a, the algo-
rithm Ch-NPriv(d,i,a) terminates.
Theorem 3.7 For any nite sequence d, index i and high symbol a, it holds
that NPr(d; i; a) if and only if Ch-NPriv(d,i,a).
Note that Ch-NPriv(d,i,a) performs at most k times the body of the ex-
ternal cycle. The internal cycle calls either the algorithm Ch-path-symb or
the algorithm Ch-path at most jR(A)j times, with jR(A)j the number of re-
gions of R(A). Finally, both Ch-path-symb and Ch-path construct at most
O(jR(A)j  t
2
) tuples.
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Corollary 3.8 It is decidable in polynomial time whether NPr(d; i; a).
4 Further Work
In this paper we have introduced the \no-privacy" property, which corresponds
to the ability, by an attacker, to infer information on the private behavior of
a system from the observable behavior.
To model a real time system that respects privacy, we can consider prop-
erties derived from the property NPr(d; i; a) considered in the paper.
The rst step is to consider properties such as 9a 2 H:NPr(d; i; a), mean-
ing that the performance of some secret action follows a sequence of observable
actions, and 9i 2 [1; length(d) 1]:NPr(d; i; a), meaning that the performance
of some secret action is implied by a sequence of observable actions. Both
properties are decidable, since NPr(d; i; a) is decidable and it is suÆcient to
enumerate the cases.
An interesting property is 9d:NPr(d; i; a). This property holds if there is a
sequence of observable actions implying a secret action. In this case we cannot
enumerate the cases. Moreover, even if such a property would be decidable, we
cannot enumerate to prove the property 9d:9i 2 [1; length(d) 1]:NPr(d; i; a).
So, one may consider weaker properties. As an example, the property
9d. length(d)  n and NPr(d; i; a) considers only nite-length sequences
of observable actions. (It is usually suÆcient to observe a nite number of
observable actions to describe time attacks on protocols). Note that the se-
quences d such that length(d)  n are not nite because times are innitely
many.
We might also consider sequences d in (  Interval)

instead of ( 
T ime)

. This kind of sequences permit to consider more general behaviors.
As an example, a possible sequence is (a; [0;1))(b; [3; 3])(c; [2; 5)), meaning
that a is performed in the interval [0;1), b is performed 3 units of time after
a, and c is performed when a time in [2; 5) after b is elapsed.
Our aim is to study the decidability of such properties.
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